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Primacy of the State in Global Integration:
Successful Strategies for Gaining State Support
for Global Maritime Security Integration*
by Jeffrey Decker
Introduction
Since September 2008, the number of states patrolling the waters off the Horn of Africa has 
increased (“EU Naval Operation”, 2009; Seibert 2009; Willett 2009).  While the majority of 
literature addressing the response to Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Somali territorial 
waters  has  traditionally  concentrated  on national  and  multinational  naval  approaches,  the 
recent  focus  of  academic  inquiry  has  transitioned  to  the  emergence  of  global  maritime 
security structures (Berube,  2007; Etzioni,  2009).   The reason for this  shift,  according to 
Chalk (2008: 2) of the Rand Corporation, is that the dangers piracy poses today require the 
pooling  of  state  naval  assets,  since  these  new challenges  are  qualitatively  different  from 
traditional maritime security threats. 
Historically models of integration in maritime governance have been the predecessors for 
integration in other public areas not confined to the control of a single person or state, a 
situation termed “global commons”1 (Snape and Gunaselara 1997: 3; Triggs 2006).  Because 
of  this,  the  fields  of  Strategic  Studies  and Global  Governance  have  been  encouraged  to 
explore global governance structures emerging as a result of Somali piracy.  Of particular 
interest  is the impending establishment of global maritime security networks to overcome 
problems currently stymieing national and international piracy suppression efforts in the Gulf 
of Aden and Somali waters.  Growing state cooperation and coordination in these waters has 
been accompanied by analyses on theoretical applications of various theories and models of 
global  naval  integration  to  combat  contemporary  piracy  (Berube  2007;  Galdorisi  2007; 
* The views of Research Papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, position or 
policies of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies. Bearing in mind the controversial debates 
now occurring in International Relations, Strategic Studies, and East-West Studies, the editors endeavour to 
publish diverse, critical and dissenting views so long as these meet academic criteria.
1“Global commons are natural assets outside national jurisdiction such as the ocean, outer space and the 
Antarctic” (Glossary of Statistical Terms, OECD, 2001).
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Archibugi and Chiarugi 2009; Seibert 2009).  Exploring the capacity of joint military task 
forces and their operational capacities are critical to restoring security and safeguarding the 
transit of international trade through this important trade route (Middleton 2008; International 
Maritime  Bureau  [IMB]  2009a;  IMB  2009b).2  In  particular,  the  coalescence  of  global 
enforcement structures has been of specific interest in light of statistical evidence showing 
the futility of recent national and international military responses (IMB 2008; IMB 2009b; 
International Maritime Organization [IMO] 2009).  
The difficulty in suppressing Somali pirate attacks is exemplified by joint operations between 
the Combined Task Force 151, NATO, and the European Naval Force.  They continue to 
respond slowly to pirate attacks because of communication failures, while mission successes 
are  thwarted  by  national  legal  incongruities  impairing  the  ability  of  the  task  forces  to 
prosecute and punish perpetrators when they are detained (Kontorovich 2004; Kraska and 
Wilson  2008).   Thus,  at  the  global  level,  state  cooperation  reveals  the  collective  will  to 
contain  piracy,  but  not  the  capacity  in  view of  an  absence  of  integrated  processes.  This 
suggests the problem lies in the interrelationships at the global-state interface.  
This  paper  explores  this  interface  by  theorizing  the  global-state  relationship  apropos  the 
development of global maritime security networks.  It uses two case studies to lay out state-
level  strategic  responses by global  networks to  integrate  state  navies  in pursuit  of  global 
security objectives.  As a result,  the main findings of this paper indicate  that  discourse in 
global security between Rationalist and Internationalist perspectives is dealt with through the 
global-state  nexus,  thereby  affecting  the  way  global  maritime  integration  is  developed. 
Specifically,  this  interrelationship  empowers  the state,  since global  security integration  is 
contingent on the ability of global networks to appeal to state-centric ambitions. 
Theorizing the Global-State Naval Nexus and the World’s Response to Piracy
 
Piracy is considered to be hostis humani generis, or an enemy of humankind, which society 
has  been  combating  since  the  establishment  of  sea-based  trade  (Joyner  2005:  137). 
2 Annually, more than 22,000 commercial vessels transit the Gulf of Aden carrying eight percent of the world’s 
oil from the Middle East and goods from Asia to Europe and North America (Kraska & Wilson, 2008: 41; 
Middleton 2008: 3; IMO, 2009).  
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Accordingly, because piracy impinged upon the principle of the right to free seas established 
in  1609  by  Hugo Grotius  (Hall,  2006:  7;  Triggs,  2006:  8),  it  has  been  the  impetus  for 
collective efforts since the Hanseatic League of the 13th Century (Menefee 1990: 132).  As 
such,  piracy is  the original  universal  crime recognized  alongside  state  sovereignty in  the 
Treaty  of  Westphalia  in  1648  (Kontorovich  2004:  190).   Correspondingly,  piracy,  as  a 
unifying evil, has caused the maritime sector to become the natural vanguard in the evolution 
of trans-societal integration. 
Piracy’s unifying effect on sovereign states began from the late 18th Century when Thomas 
Jefferson proposed the creation of a league of maritime states to combat the Barbary Pirates 
in 1790 (Morris 1979: 69).  Although the proposal failed to garner mass support in Europe, 
which ultimately led to the its demise, the subsequent drawn-out conflicts between the United 
States and the Barbary Pirates (1801-1805 and 1815) indicated that maritime security is best 
accomplished through multilateral means (Menefee 1990).  This unilateral failure represented 
a transitional period in international relations as the historically state-centric foreign policy 
perspective gave way to a collective approach to the mutual problem of piracy on the high 
seas.  This shift reflected both the willingness of states to cooperate in achieving shared goals 
as well as the limited ability of states to suppress piracy unilaterally.  
Today, this shift is perpetuated by multinational task forces enhancing integration in naval 
operations  against  piracy.  This  compensates  for  individual  state  military  obsolescence  in 
dealing with asymmetric threats from non-state actors such as pirates (Mullen 2005; Berube 
2007).   Consequently,  the inability  of traditional  navies  worldwide to adequately address 
contemporary piracy has  nurtured  strong perceptions  that  further  integration  is  needed to 
enhance  the  security  of  the  seas  through  collaborative  efforts  between  states.  If  this 
perception is true, then the establishment of a global naval structure, in the Gulf of Aden and 
the  world’s  seas,  could  have  implications  beyond  the  maritime  security  environment. 
However,  Berube  (2007:  602)  suggests  that  the  loss  of  state  sovereignty  and  potential 
multinational failures will inhibit the creation of a global maritime structure since integration 
is driven by states, and states are traditionally averse to these trends.  
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Thus, the argument on whether to create a multinational, integrated, global maritime-network 
or continue to focus on unilateral maritime operations remains controversial.  These differing 
positions  exist  because of the discourse between Rationalists,  a  theoretical  component  of 
Realism  that  is  synonymous  with  ‘structural  offensive  realism’,  and  Internationalists  on 
whether  the nation-state  or  the world’s  people  are  the primary subject  of  global  security 
(Pettman 2005: 144-145).  According to Mearsheimer (2001), a Rationalist within the Realist 
tradition  and  the  founder  of  offensive  realism,  the  focus  of  global  security  is  the  state. 
Mearsheimer (2004: 63) also emphasizes this point in suggesting: 
[G]reat powers do not work together to promote world order for its own sake.  Instead, 
each seeks to maximize its own share of world power, which is likely to clash with the 
goal of creating and sustaining stable international order.
Conversely,  Internationalists  argue the  primacy of  human  security.   Pettman  (2005:  145) 
states:
Securing people . . . necessitates greater interstate cooperation and collaboration as 
state  .  .  .  borders  become colanders  not  canopies  and  as  they  find  themselves 
obliged to respond with cooperative regional and global initiatives to deal with [global 
issues]. 
Therefore,  debate on the intensity of naval integration is a construct that  is facilitated by 
discourses on state and human security. Such discourses try to articulate the future trajectory 
of naval operations against piracy in a global society. However, the amalgamation of naval 
power and global governance is a multi-dimensional dynamic process that is more complex 
than monolithic security paradigms would suggest.  Accordingly, Rosenau (1995: 9) states 
that there
. . . is no single organizing principle on which global governance rests, no emergent 
order  around  which  communities  and  nations  are  likely  to  converge.   Global 
governance is the sum of myriad - literally millions of - control mechanisms driven by 
different histories, goals, structures, and processes.
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As such,  pinning  down  specific  organizational  principles  that  support  the  emergence  of 
global governance at large is problematic. However, because the process of global integration 
refers to an increase in interconnectedness (Weber 2008: 274), and military integration is 
specifically  associated  with  linking  personnel,  weapons  systems  and  technology  for  a 
concerted  approach  to  warfare,  organizational  principles  of  global  governance  can  be 
discerned in specified issue-areas such as global naval integration.  
Accordingly,  Pattberg’s  (2006:  10)  concept  of  global  governance  is  based  on  several 
assumptions.   Three of these assumptions relate specifically to the phenomenon of global 
naval integration:
 
1) [global governance] ascribes special relevance to non-state actors;
2)  is  concerned  with  new  modes  and  mechanisms  of  producing  and 
maintaining global public goods and;
3) highlights the establishment of new spheres of authority beyond the nation-
state and international cooperation.
By applying these assumptions to global naval integration, several organizational principles 
may be discerned as  states  converge  around the  singular  goal  of  piracy suppression.   In 
determining  the  emergence  of  a  global  naval  alliance,  critical  organizational  principles 
indicating global integration are presented by the failures of current multinational structures. 
The most notable determinants of integration failure are the incongruent national legal norms 
that inhibit the creation of joint standards, and the inability to communicate, which impairs 
collective responses to piracy.  
Clearly, because of the integral role these organizational principles play in the cohesion of a 
global  network,  they  are  effective  indicators  of  present  levels  of  integration  in  global 
maritime security networks. This aspect is evidenced by the unreliability of multinational task 
force responses to piracy, as well as the tenuous process of prosecuting and punishing pirates 
upon  detainment.   However,  while  these  organizational  principles  are  important,  the 
application of the Rationalist and Internationalist paradigms are the best indicators of future 
levels of integration as they are both the harbinger of multinational failure and presage global 
integration.  The reason for this is that state participation in global security hinges on how 
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states perceive global threats to their interests.  The following case studies offer a vignette of 
integration strategies  used by two global  maritime security networks that  have seen their 
state-focused integration strategies rewarded by state support, compliance and integration at 
the global level. 
Case Studies: The Global Maritime Network and Proliferation Security Initiative 
Maritime partnerships have employed a range of integration strategies on the seas for many 
years.   Beginning  in  2001  with  the  proposal  of  the  17  member  Regional  Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), the 
approach to maritime security has focused on intergovernmental cooperation at the regional 
level (ReCAAP 2010). Recently,  however, regional  security structures have given way to 
global security structures which often extend partnership to intergovernmental organizations, 
non-governmental organizations and corporations, as well as states.  
The Global Maritime Partnership and the Proliferation Security Initiative are two examples of 
emerging global maritime security networks. The Global Maritime Partnership focuses on 
variations in global integration levels and the primacy of the state to attract broad support for 
their anti-piracy network. The Proliferation Security Initiative, although not an anti-piracy 
partnership,  is also integral  in facilitating global integration by bypassing traditional  state 
partnership mechanisms. Both of these structures concentrate on variations of cooperative 
techniques that extend beyond states. 
Global Maritime Partnership3
The Global Maritime Partnership (GMP) is an amalgamation of state and non-state actors. 
National navies and law enforcement agencies, as well as shipping companies, tackle issues 
such  as  sea-based  terrorism  and  piracy  by  improving  maritime  domain  awareness  and 
enhanced maritime enforcement capacities, facilitating information flows and intelligence in 
a  global  partnership  (Berube  2007:  601;  Chalk  2008:  40).   The  aim is  to  create  a  more 
integrated network through partnership building, particularly between shipping, regional, and 
3 See Appendix A.
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major port states.  The GMP’s success in the maritime security environment, while other task 
forces fail, can be credited to its informal structure that promotes global maritime security 
without  the  use  of  treaties,  alliances,  formal  support  structures  or  binding  agreements 
(Woodson 2007).   Further,  the Partnership has no independent  state  leadership or formal 
membership  requirements  (Woodson  2007).   Accordingly,  GMP  goals  are  to  secure 
international waters, while allowing national navies to pursue their individual state security 
objectives (Berube 2007: 601).  Its success in integrating maritime actors against maritime 
threats  is derived from a policy of enhancing globalized integration between states while 
respecting  state  sovereignty issues and emphasizing  the growth in  security  as a  result  of 
strengthened partnerships.  In this case,
 . . . dominance is not just about combat power: it is also about our ability to work with 
other nations to provide global maritime security and prevent conflict. (Admiral Gary 
Roughhead, Chief of US Naval Operations, in Kraska, & Wilson 2008: 45)
When national navies talk of success in increasing maritime security, they speak the language 
of suppressing the dangers at sea through a collective response because of its deleterious 
effects  to  state  and  international  commercial  interests.  US  naval  officers  tasked  with 
developing this network have predicated its foundation on the assumption that everyone has 
an interest  in the safety and security of the world’s oceans as piracy threatens sea lanes, 
commerce, and navigation, while undermining regional stability (Kraska, & Wilson 2008: 43; 
Rahman  2009:  47).  As  such,  the  Global  Maritime  Partnership  leverages  the  economic 
benefits of working together to secure state dependent international trade on the high seas 
(Woodson 2007).  In this way, integrating maritime security to obtain economic objectives 
strengthens  state  sovereignty  as  free  seas  facilitate  the  trade  of  goods.   This  strategy of 
reinforcing aspects in which states can gain from enhanced global integration places the GMP 
as a non-sovereignty threatening network to Rationalist  minded state leaders that  want to 
limit integration.  
Responding  to  the  increase  in  piracy  off  the  Horn  of  Africa,  the  GMP  has  established 
partnerships  with  non-state  actors  as  well.  Increasing  the  number  of  partnerships,  both 
governmental and non-governmental, enhances the breadth for consultation on development 
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and implementation (Woodson 2007). For this reason, the GMP has made integral  use of 
international  organizations,  specifically  the  International  Maritime  Organization,  the 
International Labor Organization and the World Customs Organization ‘to foster the creation 
of maritime norms or globalize preexisting regional norms’ (Woodson 2007).  This logic has 
also been applied to the commercial sector as the GMP envisions extending partnership to 
some  46,000 commercial  vessels  (Galdorisi  2007:  69).   As  a  result,  by  recognizing  and 
encouraging the primacy of existing systems and regional coalitions, the GMP has created a 
forum where ‘best practices’ in the commercial industry and state security can be shared to 
enhance the overall safety of the seas. This provides members with ‘the framework to think 
globally, while acting regionally’ (Woodson, 2007).
Proliferation Security Initiative4
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) addresses Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
proliferation.   Although it  does  not  deal  with  piracy  per  se,  research  into  its  globalized 
structure and organizational techniques is useful when discerning integration procedures that 
can benefit the development of a globalized anti-piracy network.  The PSI was established on 
31 May 2003 with eleven member states as a response to a security gap in the international 
system (Etzioni 2009: 7).  Currently, it has more than 90 members including the whole of the 
European Union and the G-8 (Squassoni 2006: 1, 4; Etzioni 2009: 8).  
The PSI has altered the structure of older international systems whose bureaucracies impede 
the flexibility, speed and breadth needed to address cross-border problems (Etzioni 2009: 7). 
As  a  result,  the  PSI  is  successful  at  facilitating  concerted  ship-boarding,  ‘shutting  down 
facilities,  seizing  materials,  and  freezing  assets’  because  it  ‘strengthen[s]  political 
commitment of likeminded states to follow through’ to counter weapons proliferation on a 
global scale (Bush 2004).  It functions continuously as a rudimentary police force at sea and 
has been successfully employed over a dozen times (Etzioni 2009: 9).
Four key factors contribute to the success of the PSI’s international operations—flexibility, 
integration/coordination,  international  legitimacy,  and  state  sensitivity  (Squassoni  2006; 
4 See Appendix B.
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Etzioni  2009).   First,  the  PSI  is  extremely  flexible  as  it  does  not  have  an ‘international 
secretariat, offices in federal agencies established to support it’, nor ‘reports of successes or 
failures and no established funding’ (Squassoni 2006: 4).  Because of its lack of structure, the 
Bush Administration referred to it as ‘an activity not an organization’ that has participants 
and  not  members,  which  emphasizes  the  responsive  characteristics  of  this  non-restrictive 
structure (Etzioni 2009: 8).  
Second, integration and coordination between states have facilitated operational successes as 
reaction  time  has  decreased  by  bypassing  the  past  multinational  task  force  reliance  on 
intergovernmental  bureaucracies,  like  the  UN,  which  shroud  operations  with  red  tape 
(Squassoni  2006:  5).  Streamlining  occurs  at  the  state-level  during  frequent  joint  training 
operations  rehearsing  communication  and operational  exigencies  to  increase  coordination 
(Etzioni 2009: 8).  These measures enhance the PSI’s success because, in theory, each PSI 
state acts unilaterally in sharing intelligence and coordination activities thereby requiring a 
high  level  of  support,  transparency and interdependence  which  are  fostered  during  these 
exercises.  
Third, international legitimacy contributes to the success of the PSI by drawing support from 
state participants, which is crucial because it relies on state resources. Legitimacy was gained 
by the Initiative through UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673, which indirectly 
endorse the PSI by criminalizing  WMD proliferation.  The PSI has  also been legitimized 
through bilateral  agreements that legalize ship-boarding between states under international 
law (Squassoni 2006: 5).   
Fourth, and most importantly,  the PSI prioritizes the centrality of states in its operational 
principles. The PSI’s structure now permits further integration to create a web of partnerships 
that inhibit the ability of proliferators to trade WMDs and materials (Squassoni 2006: 4). This 
does  not  impinge  upon  state  sovereignty  in  the  process  because  it  is  a  non-binding 
cooperative endeavor. This strategic refocusing was prompted after India held that rigid PSI 
objectives were discriminatory in 2005 (Squassoni 2006: 2). As a result, PSI objectives are 
‘encouraged’ and not mandated, giving states leeway in choosing which policies to follow 
and which to ignore.  Further, because the ‘hard power’ of the global network emanates from 
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states, sensitivity to individual states is mandatory.   As such, the PSI empowers states by 
relying  on  their  strength  and  ingenuity  to  operationalize  the  overall  objectives  of  the 
Proliferation Security Initiative.  
The success of the PSI has called for an expansion of its operational mandates beyond the sea 
and into space (Etzioni  2009:  10).  The PSI’s strategies  embrace  two guiding operational 
principles - enhance integration through flexible objective goals, and defer to the strength of 
national navies to reinforce sovereignty. As a result, PSI has successfully created a loosely 
tailored global initiative that enhances state integration and strengthens its individual role in 
global maritime security issues.
Significance for Global Integration Strategies
State naval integration policies link directly to their conception of attaining higher levels of 
security in response to global security threats. On the state level, this strategy is designed to 
maintain  autonomy by facilitating  national  naval  capabilities  and  deferring  public  danger 
problems to  a  collective  naval  body.  This  limits  the  need  for  states  to  further  acquiesce 
sovereignty in integrating naval operational structures. However, it is also clear that states 
cannot ignore the benefits global integration have had on collective naval operations. As a 
result, although global integration is met with criticism by state governments, the role global 
naval networks can play in combating non-state actors in the ‘global commons’ should not be 
understated (see Berube 2007; Galdorisi 2007; Archibugi and Chiarugi 2009; Rahman 2009).
What  is  interesting  is  how  global  networks  attempt  to  reconcile  the  conflict  between 
Rationalists (protection of sovereign power and the centrality of state in security matters) and 
Internationalists (production of public goods and the centrality of people in security matters) 
based on the integration of organizational principles. In other words, these global maritime 
structures  have  managed  to  establish  a  loose  set  of  global  parameters  that  guide  the 
integration  process  beyond  states  to  include  non-state  actors.  The  success  of  both 
organizations in fostering integration is based on their ability to mitigate the polarization of 
monolithic security paradigms.  This supports an effective global integration strategy that 
facilitates  the  achievement  of  global  security  goals  without  entering  into  a  binding 
partnership where impingements on sovereignty may occur.
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As Berube (2007) suggests, global integration in anti-piracy operations means that the costs 
associated with unilateral  power are averted in collective security structures. Clearly,  few 
states  advance  a  wholly  Internationalist  perspective  toward  global  security  and  no  state 
champions a withering of national power. Yet, the Global Maritime Partnership’s strategy of 
aligning its goals with state-centered notions of security has proven to be successful.  The 
Partnership has done so by linking into a key national interest,  that of economic security. 
GMP successes relate directly to its ability to pair state security goals with global security 
ambitions.  This  success  was  achieved  through  the  use  of  existing  regional  anti-piracy 
mechanisms  and linking them to create  a  global  partnership  through a series  of regional 
partnerships. Mechanisms like these emphasize the regional practice of using non-state actors 
by focusing on international trade and the threat piracy poses to it, thereby distancing states 
from the one-dimensional security perspective that is evinced by either zero-sum or relative 
gain logic.
Understanding the absorption of states in their own security matters, in relation to integration, 
and exploiting this constraint is critical for developing global security networks. In this way, 
the Global Maritime Partnership and Proliferation Security Initiative operate  on the same 
levels of association in constructing global partnerships to enhance global security. Because 
these  structures  embody  the  Internationalist  perspective  while  understanding  the  state 
Rationalist perspective, they can enable global partnerships by appealing to specific state-
level security issues rather than broad global security issues.
The appeal to global issues is done in different ways by the GMP and the PSI.  For example, 
the PSI appeals to state security by bolstering the national desire for a strong navy, while 
granting states the flexibility to pursue this goal by adhering to the PSI as much or as little as 
they wish.  This encourages and emphasizes a strong state naval force to enable the PSI to 
achieve its objective.  Paradoxically, this global strategy, while strengthening global security, 
relies  exclusively on individual  state  motivations  to deter  and reduce  global  threats.   By 
establishing a joint goal that intersects Rationalists and Internationalists principles, the PSI 
produces a broad foundation,  with more than 90 members,  in support  of PSI goals. This 
strategy, when coupled with integration and cooperation through collective efforts towards a 
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single goal, projects an image of the PSI as directly serving the interests of the state as well as 
indirectly  achieving  Initiative-based  goals.   Once  Rationalists’  and  Internationalists’ 
sensitivities are addressed other organizational principles, such as legal and communication 
standardization and establishing international legitimacy, can occur.  
The GMPs strategy appears to follow that of the PSI with an emphasis on state sovereignty 
and state security.  However, while the PSI concentrates state ambitions on the amount of 
power to be gained in joining the Initiative, the GMP depicts the economic losses states are 
likely  to  incur  if  action  is  not  taken  under  the  Partnership.  The  success  of  the  GMP’s 
integration strategy relates to its ability to maximize the benefits of integration by avoiding 
catastrophic  events,  thereby  asserting  state  influence  on  the  global  threats.  Through  this 
strategy,  the GMP is  reducing costs  to commercial  vessel  owners,  safeguarding maritime 
cargoes and crew, and facilitating state profits through international trade by concentrating 
state  policy  on  tangible  economic  problems  that  directly  affect  the  health  of  a  national 
economy. It appeals to Rationalists who are concerned with securing the economic prosperity 
of  the state,  while  also appealing to  Internationalists  who are  concerned about  the threat 
piracy poses to government, commercial, and private seafarers.  By spotlighting and linking 
the  state’s  discursively-constructed  economic  security  value  system  and  marshalling  the 
resources needed for it to achieve the Partnership’s goals, the GMP demonstrates a desire to 
work with states and advance global security.
Conclusion 
Given the interplay between the subject of global security, Rationalist concentration on state 
security  and  Internationalist  concentration  on  human  security,  the  construction  of  how 
security  affects  the  state  becomes  an  important  challenge  to  the  establishment  of  global 
networks at the state level. As such, this relationship is an influential component of collective 
anti-piracy operations in the waters off the Horn of Africa and helps to explain varying levels 
of integration in global maritime networks and the reluctance of states to remedy challenges 
to existing collective operations.  
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Clearly,  the relationships  established between states and the integration desired by global 
partnerships are based on the primacy of state security over global security. At a superficial 
level, the strategy is merely a realistic way for states to protect their national sovereignty and 
boost  their  power  by  participating  in  a  globally-integrated  remedy  for  global  security 
problems.   Yet,  the  reinforcement  of  state-centered  security  has  wider  implications  on 
different aspects of maritime security threats. By supporting a value system that defers to the 
state  to  bolster  global  integration,  global  maritime  security  networks  exacerbate  the 
dichotomy between state security and global security. Attempts to reconcile global security 
issues with state security ideals limit the overall influence of global security issues at the state 
level.  Thus,  as  global  security  networks  are  created  and/or  strengthened  through  state 
cooperation and global integration, state-centric ambition is empowered at the global level. 
As states enhance integration around the discursive constructions of global security,  state-
centric Rationalist security concepts become more powerful.
Given  Mearsheimer’s  (2004)  Rationalist  analysis  and  Berube’s  (2007)  maritime  specific 
analysis, the capacity to establish global maritime security networks hinges on the ability of 
the global  networks to appeal  to state-centric  ambitions.  This having been said,  although 
piracy is a universal crime that affects global intercourse between states, the threats piracy 
pose need to be subject to a state, and therefore global, response. The ideological impact of 
this state-centric default is that a situation is created whereby sovereign states more readily 
(and possibly more stringently) appraise the value of adopting global policies in relation to 
the benefits  that  can be achieved through state  action.  The case studies validate  that  the 
discourse between state/global, Rationalist/Internationalists and autonomy/integration operate 
concurrently  and influence  one  another.  This  is  so  because,  despite  increasing  trends  of 
complex interdependence and globalization, the formation of global networks relies on state 
power to drive global integration.  The discourse of global security empowers state-centered 
security as threats and dangers have consequences for the state, thus fostering the Rationalist 
concept in global security. Within this structure of perceptions and interactions, state-level 
decision makers, determining whether or not integration benefits the state, hold the power to 
decide the future of global maritime security networks. As a result, a strengthened adherence 
to the Rationalist paradigm on global issues in the maritime domain, a historically tenable 
field of multilateral integration, indicates that integration in non-maritime domains could face 
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even  greater  problems  bridging  the  global-state  divide.  However,  current  anti-piracy 
networks spearhead integration structures in the ‘global commons’.
Appendix A
The Global Maritime Partnership in Practice
The momentum for worldwide maritime partnerships like the Global Maritime Partnership is 
growing worldwide as many states and navies seek collective action against maritime threats 
(Galdorisi 2008).  The biggest challenge to this trend is interoperability between states with 
common strategic  objectives.  Accordingly,  the  largest  effect  the  GMP has  on combating 
maritime piracy is by mitigating the C4ISR (command control, communications, computers, 
intelligence,  surveillance,  reconnaissance)  disparity  between  states  and  by  facilitating 
coordination,  de-confliction,  and  intelligence/information  sharing  between  member  states 
(Galdorisi 2008; Chambers 2009).  
Mitigating the disparity in C4ISR capabilities hinges on a co-evolvement of technological 
developments  (Galdorisi  2008).   Accordingly,  the  GMP  has  fostered  The  Technical 
Cooperative Program (TTCP) which serves as a collaborative forum on defense science and 
technological  developments.  Work  done  in  TTCP  laboratories  has  translated  into 
advancements  in  maritime  networking  so  member  nations  are  able  to  maintain 
communications  at  sea  while  continually  upgrading  their  C4ISR  capabilities  (Galdorisi 
2008).
Since the creation of the concept for the GMP by United States Admiral Michael Mullen, and 
its  subsequent  implementation,  it  has  also  facilitated  coordination,  de-confliction,  and 
intelligence/information  sharing  between  its  44-state  network.  This  has  been  done  by 
streamlined  organizational  structures.  Specifically,  the  GMP utilizes  the  United  Kingdom 
Maritime  Trade  Organization  (UKMTO)  and  the  United  States  Maritime  Liaison  Office 
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(MARLO) to serve as communication hubs to link navies and task forces to the maritime 
industry (Chambers, 2009).  As such, the UKMTO and MARLO are at the center of the GMP 
maritime network joining independent navies (Russia, China, Malaysia, India, and Japan), the 
merchant/civilian  shipping  industry,  the  27  member  European  Union  Naval  Force 
(EUNAVFOR), and the 23 nation Combined Maritime Forces, which includes the counter 
piracy operation Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) (Chambers 2009: 21).  
Restructured operational designs has fostered operational cohesion between member states, 
heightened the presence of naval vessels in high risk areas like the Gulf of Aden, and has led 
to  the  issuance  of  best  practices  to  the  shipping  industry  (Chambers  2009).   While 
multinational task forces like EUNAVFOR, CTF 151, and NATO continue to face significant 
operational  challenges  in  networking  and  communication,  increases  in  the  levels  of 
interoperability between and amongst these forces are alleviating these problems, leading to a 
more efficient collective maritime security presence in the Gulf of Aden.  Evidence for this is 
suggested in International Maritime Bureau reports stating that although instances of pirate 
attacks increased in 2009, the rate at which hijackings were thwarted by multinational task 
forces also increased (IMB 2009c).
Appendix B
The Proliferation Security Initiative in Practice
Although the Proliferation Security Initiative does not deal with piracy, modeling global anti-
piracy  network  after  its  integration  procedures  and  organizational  techniques  is  useful. 
Specifically, the PSI is successful at bypassing international law under Part VII of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea by members conferring power to the Initiative’s 
treaty (Global 2004).  Through the PSI treaty, members are able to inhibit the proliferation of 
weapons  of  mass  destruction  (WMD)  by  sharing  intelligence,  coordinating  interdiction 
operations, and limiting the number of channels operations must be cleared through (Etzioni 
2009).
Robert Joseph, a former United States undersecretary of state for arms control, reported that 
‘dozens of interdictions have taken place slowing nuclear and missile programs in Asia and 
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the Middle East’ (Joseph 2008). While members of the PSI have been reticent to discuss the 
Initiative’s  operations  publicly,  because of  fears  that  intelligence  sources  and operational 
methods could be compromised (Boese 2008), it has been successfully employed at least a 
dozen times (Etzioni 2009).
The  most  famous  PSI  success  story  occurred  in  October  2003  when  US  intelligence 
suspected a German-flagged ship bound for Libya from Dubai was carrying equipment for 
enriching uranium (Etzioni 2009).  Suspicions led the owner of the ship to port in Italy where 
the  Italian  authorities  seized  components  of  a  gas  centrifuge,  thereby  exposing  Libya’s 
clandestine  nuclear  program  (Etzioni  2009).  Other  successes  have  also  come  from 
intelligence sharing and multinational coordination through the PSI.  In February 2005, the 
European Union refused an export  license on a transfer  bound for Iran by citing a  non-
European national law that contravened that export control (Boese 2008). In June 2007, after 
the United States expressed suspicions of ballistic missile transfers on a Syrian plane bound 
for a round trip to North Korea, an ‘unidentified’ country denied the plane overflight rights, 
ultimately canceling, the aircraft’s passage (Boese 2008).  
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